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Summary
This report describes safeguards implementation in Finland in 2005. The report covers the 
legal basis for safeguards, activities of license holders, the inventories of the nuclear mate-
rials, the inspections performed by STUK, the International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA, 
and the European Union, the implementation of the Additional Protocol, the safeguards for 
ﬁnal disposal and ﬁnally, the statement of the Finnish nuclear safeguards during the year 
2005.
HÄMÄLÄINEN Marko (ed.). Nucler Safeguards in Finland 2005. STUK-B-YTO 245. Helsinki 2006.  
26 pp. + Annexes 3 pp.
Keywords: non-proliferation, nuclear materials, safeguards, illicit trafﬁcking, nuclear smuggling, 
comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty (CTBT)
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The peaceful use of nuclear materials has to be 
guaranteed by the most credible way. The national 
nuclear safeguards system has been established for 
this purpose: to ensure that the nuclear materials, 
equipment and technology are used only for the de-
clared, peaceful purposes. The national safeguards 
system cooperates with the Euratom safeguards 
system and with the IAEA.
The Finnish safeguards system comprises the 
authorities and licence holders. Functioning of the 
national system is subject to international control. 
Undistributed responsibility on safety, security 
and safeguarding of its nuclear materials is on the 
licence holder. It is the responsibility of the com-
petent state authority to ensure that the licence 
1 Introduction
holders comply with the requirements of the safe-
guards agreement.
Nuclear materials safeguards apply to:
• nuclear materials (special ﬁssionable material 
and source material)
• other nuclear items (components, equipment, 
materials suitable for producing nuclear energy 
or for nuclear weapons, agreements and tech-
nology)
• licence holders’ activities, expertise, prepared-
ness and competence
• R&D activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle
• the manufacturing and the export control of the 
dual use equipments, and
• the safeguards for the ﬁnal disposal.
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2 Finnish national safeguards system
2.1 Legal basis
The basis of the national safeguards is comprised 
of the Finnish Nuclear Energy Act and Decree. By 
virtue of the Act STUK issues detailed regulations 
(YVL Guides) that apply to the safe use of nuclear 
energy. The main guides related to safeguards are:
• Control of nuclear fuel and other nuclear mate-
rials required in the operation of nuclear power 
plants (Guide YVL 6.1)
• The national system of accounting for and con-
trol of nuclear materials (Guide YVL 6.9)
• Reports to be submitted on nuclear materials 
(Guide YVL 6.10).
Finland was the ﬁrst state where the INFCIRC/153-
type safeguards agreement with the IAEA entered 
into force (INFCIRC/155, February 9, 1972). This 
agreement was suspended after Finland joined to 
the European Union and the agreement between 
the non-nuclear weapon States of the EU, the 
European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) 
and the IAEA (INFCIRC/193) entered into force in 
Finland on October 1, 1995.
The national safeguards system was main-
tained after Finland joined the EU and to the 
Euratom safeguards system on January 1, 1995. 
The basic motivation for maintaining the national 
system has to do with the responsibilities assumed 
by the state following the NPT. The Euratom safe-
guards is based on the Euratom Treaty and the 
Commission Regulation No. 302/2005, which came 
into force in 20 March 2005. Reporting format of 
the Commission Regulation No. 3227/76 is still 
used by Finnish operators.
Finland signed the Additional Protocol in 
Vienna, 22 September 1998, with the other EU 
member states and ratiﬁed it in August 2000. The 
AP entered into force in April 30, 2004 after all the 
EU countries ratiﬁed it.
Finland has several bilateral agreements in 
the area of peaceful use of nuclear energy. Upon 
joining to the EU, the agreements with Australia, 
Canada and the USA were partly substituted by 
the Euratom agreements with these states. Also the 
agreements with Sweden and the UK have partly 
been expired. The old agreement made with the 
Soviet Union was continued for ﬁve years in 1999 
and the negotiations with the Russian Federation 
about new agreement are now underway.
2.2 Parties of the Finnish 
safeguards system
2.2.1 Ministries
The Ministry for Foreign Affairs is responsible 
for non-proliferation policy and the international 
agreements. The Ministry of Trade and Industry 
is responsible for highest management and control 
of nuclear energy in Finland. It is responsible for 
legislation related to nuclear energy and it is also 
the competent safeguards authority mentioned in 
the Euratom Treaty. Also other ministries, such 
as the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of 
Defence are contributing to the efﬁcient function of 
the national safeguards system.
2.2.2 STUK
According to the Finnish nuclear legislation, STUK 
is responsible to maintain the national safeguards 
system in order to prevent the proliferation of nu-
clear weapons. It regulates the license holders’ ac-
tivities and ensures that the obligations of inter-
national agreements concerning peaceful use of 
nuclear materials are met. Regulatory control of 
STUK is directed at the possession, manufacture, 
production, transfer, handling, use, storage, trans-
port, export and import of nuclear material and 
other nuclear items.
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STUK takes care of the approval of the IAEA 
and the consultation of Commission inspectors 
for Finland. STUK shall approve an inspector if 
his activities are not considered to endanger the 
safe use of nuclear energy or the prevention of the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. If STUK can not 
approve an inspector, it shall assign the approval 
to the Ministry of Trade and Industry.
The safeguards implementation by STUK cov-
ers all the typical measures of the State System of 
Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Materials 
(SSAC). In addition, STUK has its own independ-
ent audit and veriﬁcation programme particularly 
for the spent nuclear fuel to ensure the complete-
ness and correctness of the operator data. The safe-
guards implementation in national level is closely 
linked with other functions like export/import con-
trol, customs and border control, transport safety, 
preventing of illicit trafﬁcking, physical protec-
tion and certain measures of the Comprehensive 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
The transportation of nuclear and other radio-
active materials are very closely linked to the safe-
guards objectives. In Finland, STUK’s safeguards 
section is responsible to regulate the radioactive 
material transportations and acceptance of the 
transport packages. Finland, being the eastern 
border of the EU, has an important role taking care 
of the prevention of illicit trafﬁcking of nuclear ma-
terials. STUK cooperates closely with the Finnish 
Customs and offers its expertise to develop the 
monitoring of radioactive materials on the borders, 
and also to train the Custom ofﬁcers.
At STUK, safeguards duties belong to 
the Nuclear Waste and Materials Regulation 
Department (see organization chart, Figure 1). 
The department has 23 staff members and the 
following duties: nuclear waste management, na-
tional data centre for the CTBT (Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty), and nuclear materials 
regulation, including transportation of radioac-
tive materials. The director of the department is 
Mr Tero Varjoranta. In addition to the Nuclear 
Materials Section, two key staff members deal with 
safeguards: Ms Arja Tanninen, deputy director, is 
responsible for licensing issues related to nuclear 
materials; Mr Juha Rautjärvi coordinates the nu-
clear safeguards co-operation programme with the 
Russian Federation, and contributes to the non-
proliferation issues. 
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Figure 1. Nuclear Materials Section in the organisation 
of STUK.
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Seven experts (one of them part-time) were work-
ing in the Nuclear Materials Section in 2005:
• Ms Elina Martikka, Section Head (national sys-
tem, Additional Protocol [AP] implementation); 
back middle
Figure 2. Staff of Nuclear Materials Section.
• Mr Tapani Honkamaa, Senior Inspector (Non-
Destructive Analysis (NDA), coordinator of FIN 
SP to IAEA safeguards)
• Mr Marko Hämäläinen, Inspector (inspections, 
AP implementation); front left
• Mr Kauko Karila, Inspector (reporting, docu-
mentation)
• Mr Olli Okko, Senior Inspector (research and 
development [R&D], ﬁnal disposal); front right
• Mr Jaakko Tikkinen, Senior Inspector (trans-
portation, illicit trafﬁcking); front middle
• Ms Anna Lahkola, Inspector (reporting, trans-
portation); joined in December 2005; back right.
Ms Paula Karhu, Inspector (new veriﬁcation 
methods); back right of the picture; started in the 
Nuclear Materials Section on 2.1.2006.
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3 Themes of the year
Implementation of the Additional Protocol and the 
Safeguards for Final Disposal have been the major 
challenges during the year 2005, as well as the 
construction of the new nuclear power plant OL3 
in Olkiluoto.
3.1 Additional Protocol (AP)
Additional Protocol came into force in the European 
Union on 30 April 2004. The objective of the AP is 
to assure the IAEA of the absence of undeclared 
nuclear material and activities. The main part of 
this work are the declarations concerning activities 
carried out in the state.
There are three different sets of declarations 
concerning Finland, depending on who is respon-
sible for preparing and submitting a declaration: 
state, (European) Commission or both. 
In Finland, the state has delegated its re-
sponsibility for the declarations to STUK. STUK 
collects, inspects, reviews and then submits the 
information of those matters for which the state 
is wholly or partly responsible. In other words, 
STUK prepares and submits the declarations un-
der articles 2a(i), 2a(iv), 2a(viii), 2a(ix), 2a(x), 2b(i) 
to the IAEA. As a “site representative” STUK pre-
pares the site declarations under article 2a(iii) to 
be submitted to the Commission, which forwards 
them to the IAEA. The Commission prepares and 
submits the declarations under articles 2a(v)–
2a(vii) to the IAEA. Depending on the aforemen-
tioned responsibilities, STUK and Commission 
prepare answers to any IAEA questions.  STUK 
participates also to all IAEA safeguards activities 
in Finland. The Additional Protocol activities so 
far were:
2004
• Initial declarations
• STUK submitted the initial declarations to 
IAEA and Commission 8 July 2004
• Commission submitted initial declarations 
to IAEA 22 September 2004
• Complementary Access at HYRL site (Univer-
sity of Helsinki, Radiochemistry Laboratory), 24 
h notice, 21 December 2004.
2005
• Annual updates
• STUK provided the updated site declara-
tions to Commission 31 March 2005
• STUK submitted updated declarations to 
IAEA 4 May 2005
• Commission submitted updated declara-
tions to IAEA 13 May 2005.
• 2c questions
• IAEA submitted three sets of questions to 
STUK and Commission (one for state, one 
for Commission anf one for both) 15 July 
2005
• STUK answered to IAEA questions 8 Sep-
tember 2005
• Commission answered to IAEA questions 13 
December 2005 and 24 January 2006
• Complementary Access at Olkiluoto site, 2 h 
notice, 13 September 2005.
• Complementary Access at STUK site, 24 h no-
tice, 7 December 2005.
• STUK has submitted 2a.(ix)(a) declarations to 
IAEA and Commission on a quarterly basis: 
reported exports have concerned autoclaves ex-
ported to the Russian Federation by Fortum 
Nuclear Services.
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In 2005 STUK and the Commission submitted to 
the IAEA 22 declarations concerning Finland. All 
together, 36 declarations have been submitted to 
the IAEA to date. STUK has provided all the infor-
mation that the IAEA has requested in the given 
submission times. 
STUK has actively taken part to the experts 
meetings on the topic of AP - the Atomic Questions 
Group meetings, IAEA technical meetings and 
the Commission meetings organised for member 
states as well as ESARDA meetings. An exam-
ple is the Technical Meeting to the Transition to 
Integrated Safeguards for the member states, 12-
15 September 2005, which IAEA organised in Bad 
Tatzmannsdorf in Austria. The main topic there 
were safeguards approaches concerning integrated 
safeguards. In 2005, STUK also organised, within 
the Finnish Support Programme for the IAEA 
Safeguards, two Complementary Access training 
courses in Finland for the IAEA safeguards inspec-
tors. The related on-site training exercises were 
organised at Loviisa, VTT and STUK sites. 
3.2 Safeguards for ﬁnal disposal
Underground facilities for ﬁnal disposal of spent 
create a new challenge to the safeguards society. 
The main concern is that after safe disposal in 
the subsurface, there is still a need to have a cred-
ible assurance about the absence of safeguards-
relevant activities, although the nuclear materials 
are not accessible or re-veriﬁable using the tra-
ditional safeguards technologies. In order to fa-
cilitate the IAEA’s State level analysis about the 
absence of undeclared nuclear activities, the imple-
menting company was obligated to produce timely 
safeguards-relevant documents covering the whole 
lifetime of the repository. The implementation was 
commenced with the underground excavation, be-
fore of the traditional time lines for conventional 
nuclear facilities. The ﬁrst interim report was de-
livered to the IAEA on 8.7.2005. Moreover, the per-
formance of the national system was demonstrated 
to the IAEA on 16.9.2005.
3.3 Olkiluoto 3
The Finnish Government granted the licence for 
constructing a new nuclear power plant, Olkiluoto 
3, on 17.2.2005. In this connection, the construc-
tor’s plan for arranging the necessary measures 
for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons 
was approved by STUK. Construction of the reactor 
vessel and related internal parts of the reactor con-
tinued in Japan. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
of Finland gave to the Embassy of Japan the NSG 
assurances on the fuel channels to be shipped to 
Finland by December 31, 2010. 
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4 Safeguards implementation
Most of the nuclear material in Finland (see Fig.3 
and 4) is used as a fuel for the Finnish nuclear 
power plants (NPPs). The main areas relevant to 
the nuclear materials safeguards during 2005 were 
the supply of the nuclear fuel, import, transpor-
tation, storing, handling and use of it. The deci-
sion to build the ﬁfth Finnish power reactor in the 
Olkiluoto NPP area, beginning in 2005, has also 
been taken into account in the plans of the next 
year’s safeguards activities.
Figure 3. Uranium amount in Finnish nuclear power plants in 1990–2005.
Figure 4. Plutonium amount in Finnish nuclear power plants in 1990–2005.
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Table I. Summary of nuclear materials receipts and shipments in 2005.
To From FA LEU (kg) Pu (kg)
W0L1 Spain 110 19 475 –
W0L2 (1/2) Sweden 72 12 194 –
W0L2 (2/2) Sweden 48 8 130 –
W0LS W0L1 287 47 497 422
W0LS W0L2 41 6 988 48
WL0V Russia 132 15 823 –
WL0V Spain 108 13 544 – 
Russia WL0V 1 120 –
 W0L1, W0L2 & W0LS = Olkiluoto NPP, WL0V = Loviisa NPP, FA = fuel assembly; LEU = Low-enriched uranium
4.1 The Loviisa NPP
Fortum is one of the biggest energy companies 
in Scandinavia. In the past, Fortum was a state-
owned company formed from Imatran Voima and 
Neste. Fortum has electric power plants of many 
types: nuclear, gas, coal, oil, among others.
The nuclear power plant of Fortum Power and 
Heat is located in Loviisa in eastern Finland, 
where there are two nuclear power reactor units 
with common spent fuel storages (material balance 
area WL0V). The electricity generated in Loviisa 
NPP – ca. 10% of the whole electricity production 
in Finland – is used as a primal supply source in 
Finnish electrical network.
Fortum has earlier purchased the fuel for reac-
tor units Loviisa 1 and 2 mainly from the Russian 
Federation as complete assemblies. Nowadays 
about half of the fuel assemblies are imported from 
the Russian Federation and the remaining half 
from Spain. The most of uranium is of Russian ori-
gin. Until 1996 the spent fuel was returned back to 
the Russian Federation. Due to the change in the 
Finnish nuclear legislation the spent fuel has been 
stored in the interim storage since 1996.
In 2005, the Ministry of Trade and Industry 
granted an export license for returning one fresh 
fuel assembly to the Russian Federation. Based 
on previously granted import licences, in total 240 
fuel assemblies containing 29.4 tons of uranium 
were imported to the Loviisa NPP: 132 fuel as-
semblies (average uranium enrichment 4%) from 
the Russian Federation and 108 fuel assemblies 
(3.7%) from Spain. The receipts of fuel assemblies 
are stated in Table I, and total amounts of nuclear 
materials are presented in Tables II and III.
The refuelling and maintenance outage of 
Loviisa 1 was performed during 30.7. – 16.8.2005, 
and that of Loviisa 2 during 20.8.–5.9.2005. In both 
Loviisa 1 refuelling and Loviisa 2 refuelling, 108 
fresh fuel assemblies were loaded into the cores. 
Before closing of each reactor, STUK, the IAEA and 
the Commission identiﬁed the fuel assemblies in 
the reactor cores and veriﬁed the fuel assemblies 
in the loading ponds. Loviisa 1 was inspected on 
August 7, 2005 and Loviisa 2 on August 27, 2005. 
Four routine inspections were performed together 
with the IAEA and the Commission in March, 
June, September and December. In addition, dur-
ing the inspection in August 7, the IAEA also 
measured 9 fuel elements in Loviisa reactor 1 hall. 
STUK’s measurements in Loviisa are reported in 
Chapter 4.9.
Fortum reported to STUK about its interna-
tional uranium transfers. On the basis of its veri-
ﬁcation and assessment, STUK has concluded that 
Fortum has complied with its safeguards obliga-
tions.
4.2 The Olkiluoto NPP
Teollisuuden Voima (TVO) is a private company 
owned by Finnish industrial and power companies 
to whom it provides electricity at cost price. TVO 
Table II. Fuel assemblies in nuclear power plants on 
December 31, 2005.
MBA FA/SFA *) LEU (kg) Pu (kg)
WL0V 3 981/3 176 460 990 3 744
W0L1 1 111/535 188 799 775
W0L2 1 139/581 193 224 877
W0LS 5 166/5 166 878 827 7 256
MBA = material balance area, FA = fuel assembly, SFA = spent fuel assembly
*) FAs in core are accounted as fresh fuel assemblies  
(Loviisa 313 FAs and Olkiluoto 500 FAs per reactor)
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owns and operates two nuclear power plant units 
and an interim spent fuel storage in Olkiluoto, in 
the municipality of Eurajoki on the west coast of 
Finland. Olkiluoto NPP produces ca. 16% of whole 
electricity production in Finland. In Olkiluoto there 
are three material balance areas (W0L1, W0L2 and 
W0LS).
TVO uses uranium of Australian, Canadian, 
Russian and Chinese origin. Uranium is enriched 
in the Russian Federation or in the EU. The fuel 
assemblies are manufactured in Germany, Spain 
and Sweden.
In 2005, STUK granted three import licences 
for nuclear fuel to TVO. In total, 230 fuel assem-
blies containing 39.8 tons of uranium (3.5%) was 
imported to the Olkiluoto NPP, 110 from Spain 
and 120 from Sweden. The receipts and shipments 
of fuel assemblies are stated in Table I, and the 
total amounts of nuclear materials are presented 
in Tables II and III. TVO appointed three persons 
to be responsible for nuclear material control at 
the TVO NPP. After examination STUK approved 
them all.
The refuelling and maintenance outage of 
Olkiluoto 1 was performed during 5.–12.6.2005 
and that of Olkiluoto 2 during 8.–30.5.2005. In 
Olkiluoto 1 refuelling, 106 fresh fuel assemblies 
and in Olkiluoto 2 refuelling, 128 fresh fuel as-
semblies were loaded into the core. Before each of 
the reactors was closed STUK, the IAEA and the 
Commission identiﬁed the fuel assemblies in the 
reactor cores and veriﬁed the fuel assemblies in 
loading ponds. Olkiluoto 1 was inspected on June 
10, 2005 and Olkiluoto 2 on May 22–24, 2005. 
STUK, the IAEA and the Commission veriﬁed 
the inventory in Olkiluoto Spent Fuel Storage on 
November 28, 2005. Four routine inspections were 
performed by STUK, the IAEA and the Commission 
(for each MBAs) in Olkiluoto: in February-March, 
June, September and November 2005. STUK’s 
measurements in Olkiluoto NPP are reported in 
Chapter 4.9.
TVO reported to STUK about its international 
fuel contracts, fuel transfers and shipments. On 
the basis of its veriﬁcation and assessment, STUK 
has concluded that TVO has complied with its safe-
guards obligations.
IAEA conducted Complementary Access at TVO 
site in connection with the routine inspection in 
September. Complementary Access was directed 
mainly to site’s waste handling capabilities.
4.3 VTT FiR 1 research reactor
Small amounts of nuclear materials are located 
on other facilities than nuclear power plants. The 
most signiﬁcant of those is VTT research reactor 
(MBA WRRF) in Otaniemi, Espoo. STUK, IAEA 
and Commission safeguards inspectors veriﬁed the 
nuclear material inventory of VTT on 20 June, 
2005. The nuclear material inventory was found to 
be correct. The nuclear material accountancy and 
control were acceptably performed by VTT. The 
inventory of nuclear materials in the end of 2005 is 
presented in Table III.
Table III. Nuclear material amounts in Finland on December 31, 2005.
MBA U-Natural (kg) U-Enriched (kg) U-Depleted (kg) Plutonium (kg) Thorium (kg)
WL0V – 460 990 – 3 744 –
W0L1 – 188 799 – a) 775 –
W0L2 – 193 224 – 877 –
W0LS – 878 827 – 7 256 –
WRRF 1 511 60.1 0.002 – –
WFRS 44.7 1.4 592.4 0.003 2.5
WKK0 2 419 – – – –
WHEL 40.4 0.3 20 0.003 2.5
Othersb) < 0.1 – 817 < 0.01 –
WRRF = VTT FiR-1/VTT Processes; WFRS = STUK; WKK0 = OMG Kokkola Chemicals; WHEL = Helsinki University’s laboratory of radiochemistry. 
a) TVO has ca. 10.3 kg DU samples for training and exhibition purposes in Olkiluoto. 
b) Others means the small laboratories and minor NM holders listed in Table IV
14
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4.4 Minor nuclear material holders
The locations outside facilities are STUK (WFRS), 
the Laboratory of Radiochemistry at Helsinki 
University (WHEL) and OMG Kokkola Chemicals 
(WKK0).
STUK’s nuclear activities are mainly storing of 
nuclear materials. STUK has the Central Interim 
Storage for Small-User Radioactive Waste (“Small-
Waste Storage”) located in the NPP waste cave in 
Olkiluoto and the small radionuclide storage at 
STUK.
At moment the Laboratory of Radiochemistry 
of Helsinki University has no nuclear activities 
excluding store of minor amount of nuclear mate-
rial. Anyhow it is possible that they will continue 
the research work with nuclear materials in the 
future.
The only activity of OMG Kokkola Chemicals 
concerning nuclear materials is storing process 
by-products. While obtaining clean cobalt, they 
are getting sodium uranate solution among other 
substances. This sodium uranate solution has been 
timely shipped to Comurhex in France. In 2005 
there were no shipments. OMG Kokkola Chemicals 
has an operation license to store max 20 000 kg of 
uranium in this solution.
In the end of 2005, there were ten other nu-
clear material holders, mostly having some minor 
amounts of nuclear materials, mostly exempted 
materials. Almost all of them have nuclear mate-
rials in the form of depleted uranium shieldings. 
Only three holders, Geological Survey of Finland 
(GTK), Metorex International and University of 
Jyväskylä (Department of Physics) have some oth-
er nuclear materials. GTK has ca. 1.17 g of HEU 
to be used as a spike material in geological studies 
and for mass spectrometry calibrations. Metorex 
has ca. 10 g of natural uranium that they use as 
calibration material for radiation monitoring gates. 
University of Jyväskylä (Department of Physics) 
uses small amounts of NM as a material for manu-
facturing targets or sources or directly to be used 
as targets irradiated with accelerator ion beams 
or as radiation sources in calibration of radiation 
detectors for basic research of nuclear structure. 
A list of minor nuclear material holders including 
close down locations is presented in Table IV.
On 7 December 2005 IAEA conducted comple-
mentary access (CA) according to AP in STUK site. 
CA was made according to 24 h notice.
4.5 Other nuclear items
The Finnish Nuclear Energy legislation regulates 
also other nuclear items than nuclear material. 
Possession, transfer, imports and exports of those 
items requires a licence or at least a notiﬁcation to 
STUK. STUK granted Fortum Power and Heat Oy 
a licence to export nuclear information to Germany, 
and TVO a license to import two zirconium tubes 
from Sweden. The Ministry of Trade and Industry 
Table IV. Amounts of nuclear material at minor nuclear material holders.
Company
Nuclear material (kg)
MBA + use of NMU-dep U-nat U-Leu U-Heu Pu Th
Geological Survey of Finland 
(GTK)
– – – 0.001174 – – SF 0293 CA, Minor NM activities
Finnair Engineering 15.5 – – – – – SF 0302 CA, DU radiation shielding
Rautaruukki, Raahe Works 163 – – – – – SF 0303 CA, DU radiation shielding
Inspecta 304 – – – – – SF 0304 CA, DU radiation shielding
Outokumpu Stainless 100.98 – – – – – W0KU, DU radiation shielding
Centre for Technical Training, 
Metal and Machinery
15 – – – – – DU radiation shielding
Polartest 163.2 – – – – – WF1P. DU radiation shielding
MAP Medical Technologies 55 – – – – – SF 0325 CA, DU radiation shielding
Metorex International – 0.0105 – – – – U-nat standards
University of Jyväskylä,  
Dept. of Physics
– 0.003 – 0.000001 0.01 0.1 WDPJ, Basic research
STUK-B-YTO 245
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granted Fortum Nuclear Services a license to ex-
port APROS software to China. It also granted 
STUK two licenses to export the same software to 
the Russian Federation and Ukraine.
4.6 Geological repository
In summer 2004, the ﬁrst concrete step in the 
Finnish ﬁnal repository was taken as the excava-
tion of the geological site characterisation tunnel, 
ONKALO begun. The ONKALO most probably will 
be a part of the ﬁnal repository in the future as 
one of the access tunnels. In order to facilitate 
the IAEA’s State level analysis about the absence 
of undeclared nuclear activities, the implement-
ing company was obligated to produce timely safe-
guards-relevant documents covering the whole 
lifetime of the repository. In connection with this, 
POSIVA appointed a person responsible for nu-
clear non-proliferation control of the ONKALO and 
prepared a safeguards manual to be applied in the 
similar manner as the Nuclear Material Handbook 
of a licensed material holder already in the pre-
nuclear phase of the repository. After examination, 
STUK approved both in summer 2005.
During the ﬁst year of underground excavations 
STUK carried out 14 inspection activities to ensure 
the sustainability of the long-term safety analysis 
of the planned repository. The safeguards-relevant 
ﬁndings of these inspections were reported to the 
IAEA in July 2005. In detail, STUK carried out 3 
safeguards inspections to verify the as-built design 
information describing the excavated rock volumes. 
The IAEA participated in one of these inspections 
as an observer.
4.7 IAEA safeguards
The IAEA safeguards in Finland is based on the 
Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/193) between the 
non-nuclear weapon states of the EU, the European 
Atomic Energy Community and the IAEA. The 
IAEA and Euratom safeguards have agreed on co-
operation (New Partnership Approach, NPA) with 
the aim of reducing the undue duplication of ef-
fort. In Finland this has not decreased the number 
of inspection days. There is still overlap with the 
Commission and IAEA activities. In 2005 the IAEA 
safeguards activities were carried out without sig-
niﬁcant changes compared with the previous year.
The facility attachments (FA) according to the 
Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/193) were not in 
force in 2005 in Finland. This situation is not ap-
preciated but it has not negatively inﬂuenced the 
implementation. Moreover, drafting of “Safeguards 
Agreement for the Finnish geological repository” 
was initiated with the IAEA in 2004. Consequently, 
a meeting between the IAEA, Posiva and STUK 
was organised at the Agency in September 2005 
to establish formal safeguards between the State 
and the Agency already in the pre-nuclear phase of 
the repository. Sweden has a similar disposal con-
cept to be implemented. Thus, Swedish organisa-
tions SKI and SKB, responsible for disposal of the 
Swedish spent nuclear fuel, participated in that 
meeting as observers.
STUK is responsible for the approval of the 
IAEA inspectors for Finland. After receiving the 
information about the new inspector candidates, 
STUK sends the requests for comments to those 
nuclear material holders who hold construction 
and operating licenses for nuclear facilities. In 
2005, remarks were made on one inspector candi-
date by one of the nuclear material holders. STUK 
assigned the matter to the Ministry of Trade and 
Industry who did not approve the candidate. In 
2005, altogether 18 new IAEA inspectors were ap-
proved to inspect Finnish nuclear installations.
In 2005 STUK has received 20 statements by 
the IAEA concerning the inspections it has carried 
out in Finland. The only remarks in these state-
ments concerned internal cask transfers between 
KMPs at the Loviisa NPP. Due to one such un-
veriﬁed transfer, seen through surveillance system, 
IAEA performed spent fuel measurements for nine 
fuel assemblies in connection with the Loviisa 1 
Figure 5. IAEA (Doug Dell, right) visiting at the opening 
of Onkalo ventilation shaft.
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core veriﬁcation. To avoid aforementioned anoma-
lies in the future, direct electronic reporting system 
for advance notiﬁcations was established between 
the Loviisa NPP and the IAEA HQ.
4.8 Euratom safeguards
The Treaty of the European Atomic Energy 
Community (Euratom Treaty) and the EU 
Safeguards Regulation (No 302/2005) based on the 
Treaty form the foundation for the Euratom safe-
guards. Nuclear material holders and producers 
of ores that contain uranium or thorium have the 
responsibility to maintain the nuclear material ac-
countancy system and submit reports and other 
data to the Commission in Luxembourg. The cop-
ies of the reports and other data have to be sent to 
STUK.
Based on Basic Technical Characteristics pro-
vided by the operators the Commission prepares 
particular safeguards provisions (PSPs) for each 
material balance area. For the Loviisa NPP and 
the VTT Research reactor (FiR 1 reactor) the PSPs 
came into force in 1998. The Commission has 
asked for and got the comments on the PSPs from 
STUK and TVO in 2001, but the PSPs concerning 
the Olkiluoto NPP are still under preparation.
STUK is responsible of the consulting (Euratom 
Treaty, article 81) of the Commission’s inspectors 
for Finland. STUK has sent the requests of the 
Commission safeguards inspectors for comments 
to the nuclear material holders. In 2005, altogether 
19 new Commission safeguards inspectors were 
appointed to inspect Finnish nuclear installations. 
173 Commission inspectors had the inspection 
rights in Finland on January 1, 2006.
Table V. STUK’s Non-Destructive Analysis measuring equipment of spent fuel.
Method Characteristics Note
1 GBUV (Gamma Burn-Up 
Veriﬁer)
Portable, relative eff. 20%, HPGe (High Purity 
Germanium detector) placed behind 3 mm slit 
in spent fuel pool.
Only Olkiluoto has slits in the pool walls. 
2 EFORK (enhanced FORK 
detector)
Traditional FORK (Neutron/Gamma Ray 
Veriﬁcation) equipped with 20 mm3 CdZnTe 
spectrometer
Transferable. Can be used in Olkiluoto and 
Loviisa. 
3 Olkiluoto SFAT (Spent Fuel 
Attribute Tester)
Completely underwater (NaI detector inside 
watertight cover). Moving telescope.
Operation with Olkiluoto fuel transfer 
machine.
4 Loviisa SFAT (new storage) Completely underwater (detector inside 
watertight cover). No moving parts inside.
Operation with Loviisa fuel transfer 
machine.
5 Loviisa SFAT (old storage) Pipe and supporting structure. The detector 
can be either 20% HPGe or NaI detector.
Pipe has a holder for separate detector 
above water level. HPGe or NaI detectors 
have been used.
In January 2005 Finland and the Commission 
had the bilateral safeguards meeting in Helsinki. 
The main topic in the agenda was to discuss about 
the New Euratom Safeguards Approches. It was 
also discussed about the ﬁeld trial to be carried 
out in Finland to test the Commission’s new ap-
proaches in practice. Also the Nuclear Material 
Handbook, the quality manual for how the op-
erator implements safeguards in the facility, and 
which is approved by STUK, was presented to the 
Commission. It was stated that the Handbook will 
be the main tool when the Commission starts to 
implement the new approaches, especially when 
auditing of the operator’s system.
The IAEA statements were sent to the 
Commission, and the Commission amended its 
own conclusions to the statements before provid-
ing them to the State. The conclusions by the 
Commission were in line with the IAEA remarks 
– there were no outstanding questions at the end 
of 2005.
4.9 STUK’s spent fuel veriﬁcations
The measuring systems are the same than in year 
2004. List of the methods is presented in Table V. 
The characteristics of different measuring equip-
Table VI. Spent fuel measurements in Finland in 2005.
Location Date
Measured 
assemblies Method
Olkiluoto KPA 21.–22.6. 13 GBUV
Loviisa 1 
reactor hall
7.8. 9 FORK  (IAEA’s 
device)
Loviisa KPA 
new storage
22.–23.11. 394 SFAT
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ment are described in more detail in various tech-
nical reports. An overall view of STUK’s measur-
ing activities can be obtained from the reference 
(Honkamaa T, Hämäläinen M, How STUK veriﬁes 
spent fuel – and why? Proceedings of ESARDA, 
25th Annual Meeting, Stockholm, May 2003, avail-
able on CD, ISBN 92-894-5654-X).
The system itself is adequate to run the regular 
measuring programme consisting typically two 
inspections per nuclear power plant per year and 
all types of fuel.
In December 2004 STUK received new gamma 
spectrometric software “Unisampo”, which runs in 
Linux operating system, which was used in Loviisa 
SFAT campaign. The experience was very good, be-
cause the system was very reliable and stable. Also 
the new software is simpler to operate than the 
previous version. However, some essential func-
tions should be added to the software before it fully 
satisﬁes STUK’s needs.
STUK made two measuring campaigns of 
spent nuclear fuel in 2005. In June 13 spent fuel 
assemblies were measured with GBUV method 
at Olkiluoto KPA spent fuel store (W0LS) and 
November 394 items were veriﬁed with SFAT at 
Loviisa spent fuel storage (WL0V). The data ac-
quired was consistent with operator declaration.
Figure 6. Number of inspections (incl. CA) carried out by the Commission, IAEA and STUK at Finnish facilities 
2000–2005.
Figure 7. Number of inspection mandays during inspections (incl. CA) carried out by the Commission, IAEA and 
STUK at Finnish facilities 2000–2005.
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4.10 New veriﬁcation methods
4.10.1 Satellite imagery
The site declarations are to be veriﬁed by the 
authorities. Although, STUK has access to the 
Finnish nuclear facilities, the declarations gener-
ated by the operators need to be veriﬁed for their 
completeness and correctness. In order to conﬁrm 
the comprehensiveness of the site maps they are 
compared with optical satellite imagery. Satellite 
imagery provides also a tool to monitor activities at 
the ground level remotely. STUK has participated 
in national research project to evaluate the appli-
cability of commercial satellite radar and optical 
imagery in safeguards purposes.
4.10.2 Geophysical techniques
Geophysical sounding and monitoring methods 
may provide indirect indications of natural or 
man-made subsurface structures or activities in 
the subsurface underground depending on the local 
site speciﬁc soil and rock properties (Okko 2005). 
The applicability of the ground penetrating radar 
was analysed for its performance in safeguards ap-
plications (Saksa et. al 2005). Although geophysical 
methods can be considered as inconclusive in the 
classical safeguards, the remote passive seismic 
method is applied continuously at the repository 
site of Olkiluoto to conﬁrm the absence of unde-
clared activities. The sounding methods need to be 
performed at the site.
4.10.3 Environmental sampling
Initial plans were laid out for a programme of 
swipe samples and analyses in support of strength-
ened national safeguards. The programme aims to 
enhance the system of nuclear materials inspec-
tions and to ascertain the consistency of declara-
tions made to date.
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5 Transport of radioactive and 
nuclear materials
In addition to the regulations concerning transport 
of dangerous goods, transport of nuclear material 
is subject to licence as stipulated in the Nuclear 
Energy Act. These licences are usually granted for 
a longer period and no new transport licences were 
granted in 2005. For each transport, there must 
be a transport plan approved by STUK. Also a 
physical protection plan and a certiﬁcate of nu-
clear liability insurance are required either sepa-
rately or in connection with the transport plan. 
Before a package can be used for ﬁssile material 
transport, the package design must be approved by 
STUK. In 2005, fresh nuclear fuel was transported 
into Finland from Spain, Sweden and Russia. The 
western fuel was transported on trucks or trailers 
which are shipped by sea to a Finnish harbour and 
driven by road to the power plant. The Russian 
fuel was transported by rail over the border to 
Vainikkala, where it was loaded onto trucks and 
driven to Loviisa power plant. In 2005 STUK ap-
proved six package designs by validation of a for-
eign certiﬁcate. Three transport plans for import of 
nuclear fuel were approved.
20
STUK-B-YTO 245
6 Preventing illicit trafﬁcking
Import and export of radioactive and nuclear ma-
terial is subject to licence. STUK works in close 
cooperation with the Finnish Customs in order to 
prevent illegal import of radioactive and nuclear 
material into Finland. In 1990’s there were sev-
eral shipments for which the entry into Finland 
was denied because undeclared radioactivity in the 
cargo. The radioactivity was usually caused by con-
taminated material or by a sealed source among 
recycling metal. The maximum number of denials 
was in 1997 when 23 shipments were returned. 
Since 2001 the number of denials has been nil. The 
co-operation is also extended to border ofﬁcers of 
neighbouring countries. 
STUK will continue to participate in the in-
ternational work in preventing nuclear terrorism 
and illicit trafﬁcking of radioactive and nuclear 
material. In 2005 STUK participated in a meeting 
arranged by the ITWG (International Technical 
Working Group of Nuclear Smuggling) dealing 
Figure 8. Automatic radiation portal monitor at Raja-
Jooseppi border station.
with technical means to detect illicit trafﬁcking, 
organisational preparedness for operations in real 
case, exchange of information, etc.
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8 The Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) 
is an important part of the international regime on 
the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It bans 
totally any nuclear weapon test explosions in any 
environment. This ban is aimed at constraining 
the development and qualitative improvement of 
nuclear weapons, including also the development 
of advanced new types of nuclear weapons.
The CTBT was adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly, and was opened for signature 
in New York on September 24, 1996. The Treaty 
will enter into force after it has been ratiﬁed by 
the 44 states listed in its Annex 2. These 44 states 
participated in the 1996 session of the Conference 
on Disarmament, and possess nuclear power or re-
search reactors.
A global veriﬁcation regime is being established 
in order to monitor compliance with the CTBT. 
The veriﬁcation regime consists of the following 
elements: International Monitoring System (IMS), 
consultation and clariﬁcation process, On-Site in-
spections (OSI) and conﬁdence-building measures.
Finland has signed and ratiﬁed the CTBT. In 
addition to complying with the basic requirement 
of the Treaty not to carry out any nuclear weapon 
tests, Finland takes part in the international moni-
toring network aimed at verifying more global com-
pliance with the obligations of the Treaty.
In the CTBT framework, the National Authority 
is the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. STUK has 
two roles: STUK operates both the National Data 
Centre and the radionuclide laboratory. The main 
tasks of the National Data Centre are to monitor 
data received from the international monitoring 
system and to inform the National Authority about 
its monitoring results. The radionuclide laboratory 
serves the International Monitoring System by pro-
viding support in the radionuclide analyses and in 
the quality control of functions. Other national col-
laborators are the Institute of Seismology and the 
Ministry of Defence.
During 2005 the National Data Centre par-
ticipated in the meetings of the working group 
of the Preparatory Commission for the CTBT 
Organization. The task of the working group is 
to deal with the examination and development of 
the veriﬁcation issues. The National Data Centre 
provided a training course for NDC managers 
from developing countries. The course was funded 
by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. The National 
Data Centre continued developing its own routine 
monitoring system for the data received from the 
international veriﬁcation regime. During 2005 no 
anomalies were observed among the monitoring 
results.
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Figure 9. The network of 321 monitoring stations supported by 16 radionuclide laboratories, will be capable of 
detecting shock waves from a nuclear explosion underground, in the seas and in the air, as well as radioactive 
particles and noble gases released into the atmosphere.
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8 International safeguards 
cooperation
8.1 Safeguards co-operation 
in the neighbour areas
The safeguards co-operation with the neighbour-
ing areas is motivated by the need for continu-
ing enhancement of the regional security environ-
ment. Accordingly, Finland had a safeguards sup-
port programme for Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania 
as well as continue its co-operation with Russian 
Federation in this area. The focus during this year 
has been on the cooperation with the Russian au-
thorities. 
The resources of about 150 000 Euros made 
available by the Foreign Ministry were, during 
the year 2005, used within the Co-operation pro-
gramme with Russian Federation. The projects 
covered review of four regulations, two dealing 
with physical protection requirements for facilities 
and transportation. One was regulating targeted 
inspections and one established requirements for 
accountancy and control of radioactive substances 
and sources. 
Co-operation was extended in 2004 to cover 
also a case where an inspector from STUK was 
present in person during an inspection of nuclear 
material carried by the Russian Authority. During 
2005 Rostechnadzor inspectors were present in the 
safeguards inspection at Loviisa NPP. The experi-
ences were assessed and results proved to be very 
interesting for both parties. 
The construction in Finland of a spent fuel 
measurement device (SFAT) for the demonstration 
purposes at Kola NPP is progressing. All required 
components have arrived and construction started. 
The Russian delegation participating in the annual 
review meeting visited the workshop and received 
technical brief from STUK on the task status. 
Administrative responsibilities were clariﬁed to 
ensure timely completion of the project during 
2006. 
The scope of the programme was extended by 
organizing a seminar in the area of transportation 
of dangerous goods. Particular focus was on the 
practices, procedures and qualiﬁcations required 
in implementing the safety advisor function. The 
seminar was conducted in coordination with the 
Ministry of Transport and Communications, in-
cluding the Finnish Vehicle Administration (AKE). 
This was done as a response to the expressed de-
sire by the Russian Authority. Also one workshop 
and seminar was conducted in the area of regu-
lating the MOX fabrication in Russia. These new 
tasks due to their importance and priority were 
undertaken during 2005 despite risking thereby 
stretching the limits of the given budget.  
Finally, a workshop on the further development 
of the customs courses was organized instead of a 
course planned originally. The December timing 
of the course appeared not convenient. The IAEA, 
Russian Authority, Finnish Customs and STUK 
participated in the workshop. The new course 
agenda was developed, including the learning exer-
cises in the Helsinki harbour and at the Vaalimaa 
boarder station. The parties were very satisﬁed 
with the outcome. The ﬁrst new course will be held 
in Finland in February 2006. 
The projects were carried out by STUK in co-
operation with the Finnish nuclear facilities and 
experts from other organizations like the State 
Research Centre. The Ministry of Transport and 
Communications as well as the Finnish Vehicle 
Administration also provided important contribu-
tion thus ensuring successful results during 2005. 
Attention of Finland was also directed to support 
Ukraine in their efforts to hold an international 
conference on safeguards and material security in 
Ukraine in January 2006. With the ﬁnancial re-
sources of this programme representative of STUK 
participated in the work of the coordination com-
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mittee. Ukraine appears to be in need for support 
in implementation of the Additional Protocol ob-
ligations. This may have impact on the 2006 pro-
gramme priorities. 
8.2 Finnish support programme 
to the IAEA safeguards
For 2005 the Ministry for Foreign Affairs allocated 
200 000 Euros for the Finnish Safeguards Support 
Programme to the IAEA (FINSP) which was imple-
mented under the coordination of STUK. The key 
areas of the programme in 2005 were training of 
the IAEA inspectors and development of veriﬁca-
tion methods.  
In 2005 FINSP organised two training courses 
for IAEA inspectors concerning implementation 
of the Additional Protocol. During the courses 
the trainees went through simulated Additional 
Protocol Complementary Access. The courses were 
held at STUK headquarters, VTT Research Reactor 
site and Loviisa NPP. The help of VTT and Loviisa 
NPP personnel is acknowledged.
In development of veriﬁcation methods FINSP had 
two major tasks, which continue in 2005. Firstly, 
VTT developed a methodology to produce quality 
assurance samples for IAEA laboratories. The work 
included to set up apparatus to produce standard-
ised uranium particles, which can be introduced to 
QA samples in known amounts. Secondly, FINSP 
took part in joint task of EC, Sweden and Hungary 
to develop new type of veriﬁcation device for 
IAEA use. This device, known as Passive Gamma 
Emission Tomographic Veriﬁer, is expected to be 
capable to detect single missing pin inside PWR 
Figure 10. STUK’s veriﬁcation expert Tapani Honkamaa (left) is presenting the spent fuel measurement device 
(SFAT) to the Russian delegation at STUK.
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assembly. The prototype is expected to be ready for 
testing in 2007.
8.3 Activities in ESARDA
STUK is a member of the European Safeguards 
Research and Development Association (ESARDA), 
and has nominated Finnish experts to committees 
and most of the working groups (see Table VII). In 
addition, STUK participated in ESARDA’s work-
ing groups, especially the Integrated Safeguards 
working group (IS WG). STUK contributed to the 
ESARDA’s symposium in London with two pres-
entations. STUK participated in the ESARDA 
Executive Board meetings where a new ESARDA 
Agreement was negotiated.
Table VII. Finnish representatives in ESARDA organisa-
tion.
Body of ESARDA Member
Steering Committee Elina Martikka
Executive Board Elina Martikka
Scientiﬁc Committee and Co-ordination 
Board
Tapani Honkamaa
Non-Destructive Assay Working Group Marko Hämäläinen
Containment and Surveillance Working 
Group
Tapani Honkamaa
Integrated Safeguards Working Group Olli Okko and  
Elina Martikka
Veriﬁcation Technologies Working 
Group
Juha Rautjärvi
Back end of Fuel Cycle Working Group Käthe Sarparanta, 
TVO
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10 Conclusions
All the actions including nuclear materials and 
other nuclear items were carried out according to 
the Finnish nuclear legislation and regulations. 
Also the requirements of the international agree-
ments have been fulﬁlled. The implementation of 
the Additional Protocol was started rapidly. Based 
on results of STUK’s regulation it is possible to 
conclude that the nuclear materials and other nu-
clear items were used for intended, peaceful, use.
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ANNEX 1 International agreements
A list of valid legislation, treaties and agreements 
concerning safeguards of nuclear materials and 
other nuclear items at the end of 2005 in Finland 
(reference to Finnish Treaty Series, FTS)
1. Nuclear Energy Act, 11 December, 1987/990 as 
amended.
2. Nuclear Energy Decree, 12 February, 1988/161 
as amended.
3. The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons INFCIRC/140 (FTS 11/70).
4. The Agreement with the Kingdom of Belgium, 
the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal Republic 
of Germany, Ireland, the Italian Republic, the 
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom 
of Netherlands, the European Atomic Energy 
Community and the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency in Implementation of Article III, 
(1) and (4) of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/193), 14 September 
1997. Valid for Finland from 1 October 1995.
5. The Protocol Additional to the Agreement be-
tween the Republic of Austria, the Kingdom of 
Belgium, the Kingdom of Denmark, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the Hellenic Republic, Ire-
land, the Italian Republic, the Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg, the Kingdom of Netherlands, the 
Portuguese Republic, the Kingdom of Spain, the 
Kingdom of Sweden, the European Atomic En-
ergy Community and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency in Implementation of Article iii, 
(1) and (4) of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons, 22 September 1998. Entered 
into force on 30 April 2004.
6. The Treaty establishing the European Atom-
ic Energy Community (Euratom Treaty), 25 
March 1957:
• Regulation No 5, amendment of the list in 
Attachment VI, 22 December 1958
• Regulation No 9, article 197, point 4 of the 
Euratom Treaty, on determining concentra-
tions of ores, 2 February 1960.
7. Commission Regulation (Euratom) No 302/2005, 
8 February 2005
8. Council Regulation (EC) No 1334/2000 set-
ting up a Community regime for the control of 
Exports of dual-use items and technology as 
amended.
9. The Agreement with the Government of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the Republic of 
Finland for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses 
of Atomic Energy (FTS 16/69).  Articles I, II, III 
and X expired on 20 February 1999.
10. The Agreement with the Government of the 
Russian Federation (the Soviet Union signed) 
and the Government of the Republic of Finland 
for Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic 
Energy (FTS 39/69). Articles 1, 2, 3 and 11 ex-
pired on 1.12.2004.
11. The Agreement between the Government of 
the Kingdom of Sweden and the Government of 
the Republic of Finland for Co-operation in the 
Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy 580/70 (FTS 
41/70). Articles 1, 2 and 3 expired on 5.9.2000.
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12. The Agreement between Sweden and Finland 
concerning guidelines on export of nuclear ma-
terials, technology and equipment (FTS 20/83).
13. The Agreement between the Government of Re-
public of Finland and the Government of Cana-
da and Canada concerning the uses of nuclear 
materials, equipment, facilities and information 
transferred between Finland and Canada (FTS 
43/76). Substituted to the appropriate extent by 
the Agreement with the Government of Canada 
and the European Atomic Energy Community 
(Euratom) in the peaceful Uses of Atomic En-
ergy, 6 October 1959 as amended.
14. The Agreement on implementation of the Agree-
ment with Finland and Canada concerning the 
uses of nuclear materials, equipment, facilities 
and information transferred between Finland 
and Canada (FTS 43/84).
15. The Agreement between the Government of Re-
public of Finland and the Government of Aus-
tralia concerning the transfer of nuclear mate-
rial between Finland and Australia (FTS2/80). 
Substituted to the appropriate extent by the 
Agreement between the Government of Aus-
tralia and the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity concerning transfer of nuclear material 
from Australia to the European Atomic Energy 
Community.
16. The Agreement for Cooperation with the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Finland and the 
Government of the United States concerning 
Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (FTS 37/92). 
Substituted to the appropriate extent by the 
Agreement for Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses 
of Nuclear Energy with European Atomic En-
ergy Community and the USA.
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ANNEX 2 IAEA, Commission and STUK 
safeguards inspections in 2005
General Information Inspections Inspection Mandays
MBA Date Inspection type IAEA COM STUK IAEA COM STUK
ONKALO 30 Jan. 1 1
W0L1,W0L2, 
W0LS
28 Feb. – 1 March Routine inspection 3 3 3 3 3 3
WL0V 3 March Routine inspection 1 1 1 1 1 1
ONKALO (18) – 24 May 1 1
W0L2 22 – 24 May PIV 1 1 1 2 2 3
WL0V 7 June Routine inspection 1 1 1 1 1 1
W0L1,W0L2, 
W0LS
9–10 June Routine inspection  
+ OL1 PIV
3 3 3 3 3 3
WRRF 20 June PIV 1 1 1 1 1 1
W0L1 (+OL2) 21June OL1 POST PIV (+OL2) 2 2 2 2 2 2
W0LS 21–22  June STUK GBUV 1 5
WL0V 7 Aug. Loviisa 1 core veriﬁcation + 
IAEA FDET
1 1 1 1 1 1
WL0V 27 Aug. Loviisa 2 core veriﬁcation + 
PIV
1 1 1 1 1 1
W0L1,W0L2, 
W0LS
12–13 Sep. Routine inspection 3 3 3 3 3 3
Olkiluoto 
site
13 Sep. CA (2h notice) 1 1 1 1 2 1
WL0V 15 Sep. Routine inspection 1 1 1 1 1 1
WL0V 22–23 Nov. STUK SFAT 1 6
W0L1,W0L2, 
W0LS
28–29 Nov. Routine inspection 3 3 3 3 3 4
W0L1,W0L2, 
W0LS
30 Nov. System inspection 1 1
WL0V 1 Dec. Routine inspection 1 1 1 1 1 1
STUK site 7 Dec. CA (24h notice) 1 1 1 1 1 2
ONKALO 21 Dec. 1 1
TOTAL 24 24 30 25 26 42
Note: In Olkiluoto, inspections are counted per MBA. FA = Fuel Assembly, PIV = Physical Inventory Veriﬁcation
